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Using ISS as an avionics test platform supporting verification of 
safety critical avionics systems designed for long term operation in 
interplanetary environments   
• The character of long-term (1-3 years) human interplanetary space flight will lead 
    to safety and reliability  requirements more demanding (and costly) than any 
    previously encountered. Remember, if it isn’t reliable it isn’t safe.     
– To date, spacecraft crews have never been more than a few hours-to-days away from a safe 
     emergency landing.   
– There are no comparable quick/safe Earth return options for the crew of an interplanetary 
     transport a few months out from Earth.  In that case, failure really isn’t an option   
– Spacecraft electronics (avionics) systems reliability (and crew safety) depends on:  
• Generic hardware/software quality and durability in the space flight environment  
• Component/system sensitivity to the space radiation environments, especially the total ionizing dose 
     (TID) and Single Event Effects (SEE) environments 
• The primary focus of this paper is spacecraft avionics reliability in the SEE 
    environment 
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The Single Event Effects (SEE) environment and its 
effect on spacecraft avionics systems 
• Space flight ionizing radiation (IR) environments are radically different from 
the IR environments we are exposed to on Earth  
– Highly energetic charged particles (atomic nuclei and electrons) dominate the 
space flight environment 
• Galactic cosmic “rays”, trapped protons, and solar particle event (SPE) charged particles 
• Much smaller contributions from x-rays and gamma rays which contribute to TID only 
• High energy charged particles cause SEE in spacecraft avionics components 
– Energetic charged particles produce transient high density ionization tracks when 
passing through matter 
– High density  ionization tracks cause SEE in solid state electronic devices 
• Soft errors that are correctable, e.g. single event upsets for bit flips in digital memory 
• Hard device failures that fail the equipment, e.g. single event gate rupture or burn-out 
 
Primary and secondary cosmic ray ionization tracks through the depletion region (white) of the PN junction (P light grey; N dark grey) in a 
solid state device enables transient conduction that can cause a change of state in a solid state memory.   The particle tracks can be caused by 
primary cosmic rays entering from outside or primary/secondary cosmic ray particle induced nuclear reactions internal to the device.  
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Verifying spacecraft avionics reliability in the space flight 
SEE environment 
• Key concept  - Linear Energy Transfer (LET) 
– LET provides a measure of how much ionization an energetic charged particle 
produces when passing through matter 
– LET depends on both particle velocity and particle charge  
• Avionics components are tested in ground based charged particle 
accelerators to determine SEE probability  as a function of charged particle 
LET 
– Test methods such as ASTM F1192 
– Accelerator beams differ significantly from the space flight environment 
– Components often require extensive modifications to enable testing 
– Some components can’t be tested in this way at all 
• SEE vs. LET data are then combined with the expected space flight charged 
particle LET environment (including spacecraft shielding mass) to predict 
(estimate) component SEE rates ( failure probability per unit time)  
• Finally, avionics system SEE rates are predicted from component SEE rates  
 
1) Edmonds, L. D., Barnes, C. E., Scheick, L. Z.; “An Introduction to Space Radiation Effects on Microelectronics,” JPL Publication 00-06, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena 
California, May 2000 
2) Allen H. Johnston,  “Jupiter Europa Orbiter Mission, Designing Circuits and Systems for Single-Event Effects,” JPL D-33338, June 26, 2009. 
3) Schwank, J. R., Shaneyfelt, M. R.,  and Dodd, P. E.; “Radiation Hardness Assurance Testing of Microelectronic Devices and Integrated Circuits: Radiation Environments, Physical 
Mechanisms, and Foundations for Hardness Assurance,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 60 (3), June 2013, pp. 2074-2100 
4) Steve Koontz, Brandon Reddell, Paul Boeder: “Calculating Spacecraft Single Event Environments with FLUKA,” Paper W-33, Proceedings of the 2011 NSREC Radiation  Effects 




Page No. 5 
ISS_CM_019 (Rev 03/2013)     
  
 
The case for supplemental in-flight avionics testing 
for human interplanetary programs  
• Spacecraft avionics systems reliability:  ground based test and analysis vs. in-flight 
experience  
– The limitations of conventional component heavy ion testing are well known and documented and 
lead to considerable uncertainty in flight system failure rate estimates 
– Uncertainty increases when testing modern complex system-on-a-chip components (e.g. FPGAs) 
– Component level test and analysis often miss integrated system level and configuration effects 
• Christian Poivey, Janet Barth, Robert Reed, Epaminondas Stassinopoulos, Kenneth LaBel, Michael Xapos; “Implications of  Advanced Microelectronics 
Technologies for Heavy Ion Single Event Effect (SEE) Testing,” 6th European Conference on  Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems, 
2001 Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/RADECS.2001.1159302 Publication Year: 2001 , Page(s): 328-331 
• Robert Reed, James Kinnison, Jim Pickel, Stephen Buchner, Paul Marshall, Scott Kniffin, Kenneth Label; “Single event Effects Ground Testing and On-
Orbit Rate Prediction Methods: The Past, Present. and Future,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, Vol. 50, No. 3, June 2003, pp 622-634 
• Kenneth LaBel; “Single Event Effects Challenges: Testing and Modeling Shortfalls,”  NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging Workshop, June 11-143, 
2012, https://nepp.nasa.gov/workshops/etw2012/talks/Tuesday/T09_LaBel_SEE_Challenges.pdf 
• In-flight system level anomalies  not identified by ground based  test and analysis 
– Examples 
• Cassini solid state recorder multiple bit upsets 
• Cassini single event transients in power switches  
• Hubble stacked memory chip module SEE anomalies 
• Quicksat/Seawinds global positioning system single event latch-ups  
• In-flight Mercury Messenger component SEE rates orders of magnitude higher than predicted 
– Bruce Pritchard, Gary Swift, Allen Johnston; “Radiation Effects Predicted, Observed, and Compared for Spacecraft Systems,” Radiation 
Effects Data Workshop, 2002 IEEE, Digital Object Identifier: 10.1109/REDW.2002.1045525, 2002, Page(s): 7-13  
• When unexpected or anomalous events arise, the Spacecraft Operations Flight Support 
Team (SOFS) must trouble shoot the problem and implement a solution within allowable 
time constraints  
• Paula S. Morgan,; “Resolving the Difficulties Encountered by JPL Interplanetary Robotic Spacecraft in Flight,”  in Advances in Spacecraft Systems and 
Orbit Determination, edited by Rushi Ghadawala, ISBN 978-953-51-0380-6, March, 2012, pp 235-264, www.intechopen.com  
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“Test Like You Fly and Fly Like You Test” 
• James Miller, Jay Leggett, and Julie Kramer-White; Design Development Test and 
Evaluation (DDT&E) Considerations for Safe and Reliable Human Rated 
Spacecraft NASA/TM-2008- 215126/Vol II NESC-RP-06-108/05-173-E/Part 2 
– Systems Principle 6 – Design, build and verify the system employing a “test like you 
fly, fly like you test” philosophy 
– “Test Like You Fly”  is a philosophy which assures that the test environment, 
configuration, and operations reflect the way the system will be used 
• The closer to the operational environment the test conditions are, the higher the fidelity of the 
test and the more likely that the test will discover correctable problems in the hardware/software 
compliment before flight 
– “Fly (operate) Like You Test” is a philosophy which avoids operating the system in 
an environment, configuration, or way which has not been verified 
• When properly implemented, the system verification process exercises the system, in 
operational configurations and environments that, to the degree practical, accurately represent 
the flight environment and operational configurations so that fewer unanticipated problems will 
occur during flight operations 
• Conventional SEE verification using low fidelity testing at the parts level only with 
subsequent analysis to calculate the expected on-orbit failure rates is clearly NOT a 
test like you fly and fly like you test approach 
– Explains the many documented testing escapes (i.e. in-flight failure modes not detected 
during test)  
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The SEE environment at ISS and in interplanetary space: 




0.1 1.3 4.0 9.9 20.2 
Average Scale 
Factor** 
0.48 0.19 0.21 0.14 0.14 
Maximum 
Scale Factor  
0.97 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.44 
Minimum 
Scale Factor 
0.27 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.05 
Testing Time Scale FactorLET Threshold   = (Annual ISS particle fluence)/(Annual interplanetary particle fluence) 
* Note that as a general rule only those microelectronic devices with thresholds greater than 1 LET unit are useful in high 
reliability spacecraft avionics systems  
** Averages and extremes corresponding to a shielding mass range of 0.8 to 80 g/cm2 Al   
ISS to interplanetary SEE environment testing time scaling factors for a range of LET thresholds 
For charged particle LET values of interest for avionics SEE effects ( > 0.1 LET units), the annual particle fluence in 
interplanetary space is greater than the annual particle fluence at ISS. So, for the same charged particle fluence, more 
testing time will be needed at ISS than in interplanetary space.  
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Interplanetary Avionics System Reliability Testing on ISS: 
Methods and Approach 
• Use proven reliability engineering test methods utilizing Bayesian inference  
– MIL-HDBK-338B, Electronic Reliability Design Handbook, Section 8.3  
– NASA/SP-2009-569, Bayesian Inference for NASA Probabilistic Risk and Reliability Analysis, section 8.3 
– Conventional ground based SEE testing (ground up approach) provides the “Bayesian Prior” 
• For example: 
– ASTM Guide F1192-00–Standard guide for the measurement of single event phenomena  
       (SEP) induced by heavy ion irradiating of semiconductor devices [F1192M]  
– 2. JEDEC heavy ion testing guideline [JEDEC HI]  
– 3. ASTM Standard 883: Test Method 1019.5 [1019.5] 
• Alternately, new high energy heavy ion and proton test methods may provide an alternative approach 
offering considerable potential advantages over the conventional methodology, but require further 
development at this time 
– C.C Foster et al, “Certification of Parts for Space with the Variable Depth Brag peak Method,” IEEE 
Transaction on Nuclear Science, (59), No. 6, December 2012 
– C. C. Foster et al, “Risk assessment Based on Upset Rates from High Energy Proton Tests and Monte Carlo 
Simulations,” IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, (55), No. 6, December 2008 
• Note that system architecture and system redundancy determine the reliability 
requirements imposed on the individual sub-systems (“boxes”) and components 
• Step-1: select an architecture likely to meet mission requirements with reasonable 
box level reliability  
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Interplanetary Avionics System Reliability Testing on ISS: 
How would we do that? 
• Select an architecture likely to meet mission requirements with reasonable box 
levels of reliability  
– Mission duration = 3 years = 26,280 hours 
– In mission system maintenance/refurbishment – None 
– System Reliability Function, R(t) > 90% at t = 26,280 Hours 
• Using standard methods available at http://reliabilityanalyticstoolkit.appspot.com/   
– Compare various parallel redundant system architectures with respect to box/unit MTBF 
values that will meet the system reliability requirements 
– Box/unit level reliability (MTBF) must be low enough to be testable and verifiable within 
reasonable schedule and cost constraints 
• System architecture results 
– Active parallel redundancy with 3 active units and 6 cold standby units can meet the system 
requirements box/unit MTBF between 20,000 and 25,000 hours (MTBFlower with 90% 
confidence)   
– Active parallel redundancy with all units active cannot meet the system reliability 
requirements with all units active, even with 9 units 
–  Model calculation and box unit level test plans are summarized in the following 
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Interplanetary Avionics System Reliability Testing on ISS:   
An example 
System Characteristics: 
Number of units required for mission success (m): 3 
Total number of units (n): 9  
Number of cold standby units (n-m): 6 
Probability that switch will work correctly: 1  
Failure rate (λ) of each unit, failures per million hours 
(FPMH): 40.00 
Mean time between failure (MTBF) of each unit (hours): 
25,000  
Maintenance interval (T) between system renewal (hours): 
26,280 
Distribution type: Exponential 
 
Solution:  
The system reliability at 26,280 hours is:  
R(26,280 hours)=0.96 ;  
Effective failure rate of system: 1.60 FPMH  
Effective MTBF of system: 623,301 hours  
Mean time to failure (MTTF): 58,336 hours.  
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Testing at ISS: test time and number of test articles to establish an 
MTBFlower (λupper) with 90% confidence 
Inputs: 
 
Required MTBF: 25,000.0 hours. 
Allowable failures: 1 




97,243 total test hours are required, with 1 allowable failure occurring, to demonstrate a unit MTBF of 25,000 hours 




97,243 total test hours are required corresponding to 5 test articles at 19,449 hours ( 2.2 years) each in LEO 
corresponding to   0.2 x (97,243) = 19,449 hours in cis-lunar space  (0.2 is the ISS to IP SEE environment scaling 
factor determined earlier) 
  
486,215 total LEO test hours are required to demonstrate a 25,000 hour lower MTBF with 90% confidence in the 
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Summary and Conclusions 
• Routine cargo missions to ISS several times a year make in-space test and 
verification of spacecraft avionics systems possible for the first time 
• ISS provides a unique opportunity for spacecraft avionics systems developers to 
perform comprehensive, “fly like you test and test like you fly” testing  
– Flight testing on ISS makes it possible to simultaneously evaluate multiple space flight 
environment effects including: SEE effects, thermal vacuum and microgravity effects, as 
well as evaluating EDAC, FDIR, and functional interrupt recovery strategies 
– Overall avionics system reliability can be tested/evaluated in the combined flight 
environment 
– Failure modes that escape conventional ground based testing can be identified and 
corrected early in development 
– Ultimately the more severe safety and reliability requirements expected for long duration 
human interplanetary flight can be verified with increased confidence and with reasonable 
cost and schedule impacts 
• Can the ISS be used as an avionics SEE test platform for supplemental 
verification of safety critical avionics systems designed for long term operation 
in interplanetary environments?    YES    
